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Since the strength of a currency – and the public’s confidence in it – is closely related to 
the political structure that supports it, … the Eurosystem’s “institutional loneliness” will 
need to be addressed. Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa (2000).  
1. Introduction 
The Maastricht Treaty established the foundations of the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) of Europe and laid down the legal framework for the introduction and functioning 
of the euro. The EMU architecture was designed to prevent political dominance over the 
single monetary policy which – as national experience had shown – could cause high 
inflation and destabilise the currency. Accordingly, the European Central Bank (ECB) was 
given an independent monetary policy mandate with maintaining price stability for the euro 
area as a whole as its primary objective. 1 In addition, national fiscal policies were 
subjected to market discipline and common surveillance to ensure sound and sustainable 
public finances with the room for manoeuvre to address domestic shocks. Taken together, 
this was expected to secure the stability of the euro.  
At the 25th anniversary of the Maastricht Treaty, which was signed in February 1992, the 
relationship between the 19 euro area governments and the ECB seems to have shifted. 
Since the global financial crisis of 2008 a ‘new era of central banking’ has emerged, 
marked by a new style of monetary policy making (Santor and Suchanek, 2016). The 
central banks of many advanced economies – including the ECB – employed forward 
guidance and unconventional instruments to provide a sufficient amount of monetary 
accommodation at a time when the equilibrium real interest rate was estimated to be very 
low and the conventional monetary policy rate hit the effective lower bound. This 
international trend in central banking affects the role of fiscal policy in at least three areas.  
First, the monetary authorities often took resort to unconventional operations to respond to 
secular stagnation and deflationary pressures and called for a fiscal stimulus to more 
effectively restore macroeconomic equilibrium and alleviate the burden on the central bank 
(Summers, 2014). A monetary policy of maintaining low-for-longer interest rates also 
carried the risk of unintended negative side-effects for the functioning of financial markets 
and institutions. The ample availability of cheap money, if prolonged, could undermine 
                                                 
1  The responsibility for the single monetary policy of the eurozone lies with the Eurosystem and the Governing Council 
of the ECB. The Eurosystem is made up of the ECB and the national central banks (NCBs) of the euro area countries. 
This paper generally refers to the ECB unless an explicit reference to the Eurosystem is warranted.  
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bank profitability, hurt the solvency of institutional investors and push excessive risk-taking 
in search for higher yields. A fiscal expansion could in these circumstances also speed up 
the normalisation of monetary policy, which would ease the task of prudential supervisors 
to promote financial sector resilience and preserve financial stability. 
Second, many central banks undertook quantitative easing and bought public and private 
sector securities on a large scale until inflation showed a sustainable upward adjustment. 
They also applied a mix of implicit subsidies and taxes in credit operations with the 
banking sector. As a result, central banks ventured ever-more deeply in fields that are 
considered to be the prerogative of fiscal policy, such as public debt operations, credit 
allocation and income and wealth distribution, going well beyond conventional monetary 
policy or a temporary role as lender of last resort (Blinder et al., 2017). This fiscalisation of 
monetary policy raised political concerns over central bank independence (de Haan et al., 
2017). The need for democratic legitimacy and accountability made it advisable for 
governments to assume final responsibility for the fiscal and quasi-fiscal aspects of 
monetary policy (Buiter, 2014).   
Third, the large-scale asset purchases with the aim to inject a substantial amount of risk-free 
overnight liquidity into the economy have led to large-for-longer central bank balance 
sheets. When short-term interest rates move up again central banks will have to pay a 
higher remuneration on their expanded liabilities vis-à-vis the banking sector. Depending 
on accounting rules, there could also be valuation losses on the acquired assets, notably if 
these were sold again instead of being held in the monetary policy portfolio. Moreover, the 
risk of default on the securities bought cannot be excluded. The likelihood that central 
banks may have to report big losses and call on their government to recapitalise them 
increased in parallel with the size of their balance sheets (Hall and Reis, 2015). This meant 
that treasuries should provide their central bank with an indemnification for the heightened 
risk of losses associated with a much expanded balance sheet (Buiter, 2014).      
Given the emphasis in the Maastricht Treaty on separating the domains of national fiscal 
policies and the single monetary policy, the three aforementioned fiscal aspects of new-
style central banking are of particular significance to the ECB. During the euro area crises 
of 2008-13 and the sustained low inflation episode of 2014-17 the ECB had to undertake a 
range of non-standard monetary interventions to return to price stability on a durable basis. 
The exceptional monetary easing that pushed interest rates into ultra-low regions drew 
criticism for its potential adverse side-effects (van Riet, 2017c). The ECB also waded far 
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into capital and credit markets, which triggered the political question whether it should also 
take national fiscal conditions, social considerations and environmental concerns into 
account when buying securities for monetary policy purposes. The accumulation of a large 
amount of public and private sector assets on the Eurosystem’s balance sheet further 
necessitated a tightening of risk management procedures as well as a renationalisation of 
sovereign risk exposures in order to limit from the outset the fiscal transfers implied by 
sharing net monetary income as well as potential losses. Some observers therefore stated 
that the single monetary policy was stretched to the limit of its capabilities (Micossi, 2015). 
Yet, a euro area treasury to provide active fiscal support to the single monetary policy in 
reviving the euro area economy, assume final responsibility for the non-standard monetary 
policy operations and provide a fiscal backstop against large financial losses, is missing, 
reflecting the Eurosystem’s “institutional loneliness” at the EMU level (Padoa-Schioppa, 
2000, p.37). This Maastricht Treaty set-up contrasts with the framework of other monetary 
unions where the central bank is embedded in a political union and has a clearly defined 
fiscal counterpart (Draghi, 2014; De Grauwe, 2016). Their central government has access to 
a central budget voted for by the union’s parliament to implement economic policy, it is 
able to issue its own low-risk sovereign bonds, it has the ultimate capacity to backstop the 
financial risks assumed on the central bank’s sheet – and all these supranational fiscal 
commitments are backed by the taxpayers of the whole union.  
This paper reviews how the 19 euro area governments could act as the ‘joint sovereign’ 
behind the euro (Hoeksma and Schoenmaker, 2011; van Riet, 2016a) and establish more 
similar framework conditions for monetary policy as exist in other currency areas – even 
without a euro area treasury. First, member countries could coordinate a growth-friendly 
aggregate economic policy mix that is supportive of the single monetary policy with the 
help of a central fiscal capacity. Second, they could introduce a safe sovereign asset for the 
eurozone without assuming common liability so as to anchor euro area financial integration 
and facilitate monetary policy implementation. Third, the significant benefits for the 
Eurosystem from a lower burden on monetary policy and a reduced exposure to sovereign 
risk could make it feasible for national governments to share ex ante the financial risks 
associated with its non-standard balance sheet operations. The fundamental solution, 
however, lies in securing sound and sustainable fiscal positions in each and every member 
country and advancing with political integration to establish a euro area fiscal counterpart 
to the Eurosystem with full respect for its independent status.     
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The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the new era of central 
banking in the wake of the global financial crisis and how it has changed the position of 
fiscal policy vis-à-vis monetary policy. Section 3 presents three ways for euro area 
governments to assist the ECB in fulfilling its mandate while preserving its independence. 
Section 4 concludes that these fiscal support mechanisms for the single monetary policy are 
feasible within the framework of the Maastricht Treaty.  
2. The new era of central banking and the support of fiscal policy 
2.1 The separation between monetary and fiscal policies 
As observed by Goodfriend (2007), by the late 1990s, the world had achieved a broad 
consensus on the core principles of monetary policy. One of the hallmarks of this consensus 
was that central banks required an independent mandate for achieving and maintaining 
price stability, a strategy which also supported macroeconomic and financial stability. The 
conduct of monetary policy consisted of shadowing the equilibrium real interest rate (which 
some observers refer to as the natural or neutral rate), defined as the short-term interest rate 
consistent with macroeconomic equilibrium over the policy-relevant horizon. Central banks 
would typically undertake money market interventions in order to bring their operational or 
target interest rate in line with this benchmark and to influence market expectations that 
affected longer-term bond yields and thereby credit conditions and aggregate demand.  
This monetary policy focus left governments with the task of pursuing sound fiscal policies, 
given that public debt issuance was subject to the scrutiny of ‘bond market vigilantes’. 
According to the consensus view, active fiscal measures to fine-tune the business cycle 
were hard to implement in a timely, targeted and temporary manner (the TTT criteria). The 
countercyclical role of government budgets was therefore restricted to that of providing 
automatic stabilisation (Taylor, 2000). Public revenues would fall naturally as economic 
growth slowed and public spending would rise in line with the higher rate of unemployment 
(and vice versa in an upturn), leaving the cyclically-adjusted budget balance broadly 
constant. This negative attitude towards discretionary fiscal policies also reflected doubts 
about their effectiveness when private agents started to save the budgetary stimulus in 
anticipation of the higher taxes that would be necessary to service the higher debt. 
Governments should instead focus on improving the supply side of the economy by 
maintaining low tax rates, undertaking productive public investments, removing regulatory 
impediments and initiating other structural reforms.       
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The widely accepted principle of giving monetary and fiscal policies their own field of 
responsibility was also enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty, which furthermore restricted 
their geographical domain to the euro area and national level, respectively. The separation 
principle became untenable in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008 and the credit 
crunch that triggered the Great Recession of 2009. The advanced economies, including the 
European Union (EU), orchestrated a fiscal stimulus to put a floor to the drop in aggregate 
demand, but given the high budgetary costs of bank rescue operations most of them soon 
turned on a course of austerity, generally leaving their central bank alone with the task of 
finishing the job. After major central banks in the autumn of 2008 had rapidly cut their 
policy rates (close) to zero (Figure 1), passively accommodated the banking sector’s 
immediate demand for liquidity and directly intervened in financial markets to repair 
monetary transmission channels, the main question they faced was: how to further stimulate 
credit growth in a low-growth and deflationary environment? 
Figure 1 – Monetary policy rates of major central banks 
(percent per annum) 
 
Source: ECB and the respective central banks. Latest observation: 28 July 2017. 
Note: European Central Bank = Deposit Facility Rate; Federal Reserve = Target Rate; Bank of 
England = Official Bank Rate; Bank of Japan = Uncollateralised Overnight Call Rate. 
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Empirical estimates suggested that the neutral real interest rate that functioned as a 
benchmark for monetary policy rates had fallen to a level close to zero, and even to a 
negative level in the euro area (see Figure 2 based on Holston et al., 2017). To kick-start the 
economy in this situation, conventional monetary policy would have to cut the nominal 
policy rate well below zero such that corrected for below-target inflation it would stand 
sufficiently below the neutral real interest rate. But central banks feared that negative 
interest rates could trigger a massive flight into cash and raise unsurmountable difficulties 
for the financial system. As a consequence of this ‘monetary paralysis’ (Rogoff, 2017), the 
shortfall in aggregate demand had to be addressed with other tools.  
Figure 2 – Estimates of the equilibrium real interest rate in Euro Area, US and UK  
(percent per annum) 
 
Source: Holston et al. (2017), updated to 2016Q4. 
To escape from the ‘secular stagnation trap’, central banks entered on a path taken earlier 
by the Bank of Japan. They actively expanded their balance sheet through credit and 
quantitative easing (Figure 3), materially changed its composition and gave forward 
guidance to markets on their intention to maintain a very accommodative monetary stance 
over the medium run. This new-style monetary policy activism went beyond the traditional 
short-term interest rate and focused on other instruments that were capable of relaxing 
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financing conditions as usual. Control over the central bank balance sheet became the new 
operational target of monetary policy (see also Bindseil, 2016).2 The deep dive in the 
monetary policy toolbox, employing a variety of conventional and unconventional 
monetary instruments, marked a ‘new era of central banking’ (Santor and Suchanek, 2016).  
The ECB on its part undertook a range of standard and non-standard measures – involving 
a mildly negative deposit facility rate, an unlimited supply of bank refinancing on unusual 
terms, a wider range of eligible collateral, a lower minimum reserve requirement, as well as 
contingent, selected and large-scale purchases of public and private sector securities – 
supported by forward guidance on the monetary stance. After dealing with the fallout from 
the euro area crises, the aim of reducing long-term interest rates, supporting asset prices and 
easing private sector credit conditions was to prevent deflationary forces from taking hold 
and to return to price stability on a sustained basis (van Riet, 2017b,c). 
Figure 3 – Balance sheet size of major central banks, 2007 – 2017   
(monetary policy assets as a percentage of GDP) 
 
Source: ECB and the respective central banks. Latest observation: 28 July 2017. 
Note: The balance sheet of the Bank of England is approximated after 24 September 2014 since the 
Bank only discloses 90% of its consolidated balance sheet after this date.  
                                                 
2  See Cour-Thimann and Winkler (2016) on the role of the central bank ‘balance sheet of last resort’ in absorbing 
financial risks and reducing risk exposures in the balance sheets of other economic sectors. 
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2.2 Monetary policies stretched to the limit  
New-style central banking was successful in stabilising the economy in the wake of the 
financial crisis. At the same time, monetary policy at the effective lower bound for interest 
rates appeared to be stretched to the limit of its capabilities. Three fiscal policy issues arise 
when unconventional monetary policy leads to low-for-longer interest rates and bloated 
central bank balance sheets, with implications for central bank independence.  
First, to reduce the burden on monetary policy at the effective lower bound many central 
banks called for a fiscal stimulus in support of aggregate demand. A fiscal expansion could 
under these circumstances benefit from exceptionally large multiplier effects because the 
increase in expected inflation at near-zero interest rates would reduce the real interest rate, 
ease financing conditions for liquidity-constrained households and firms, raise private 
spending and ‘fill the output gap’ (Woodford, 2011). An offsetting monetary contraction 
was not foreseen until inflation had moved back up to the target level on a sustained basis.  
A monetary policy of ultra-low interest rates also raises concerns about the functioning of 
financial markets, the health of financial institutions and the incentives for excessive risk-
taking (see van Riet, 2017c). The longer exceptionally low interest rates are maintained, the 
more critical the adverse consequences for financial intermediation, financial stability and 
market incentives could become. A valid question is whether the available micro and 
macro-prudential tools are effective in counteracting the financial vulnerabilities associated 
with monetary policy keeping interest rates low-for-longer. A fiscal policy relaxation could 
help in this respect to shorten the episode of ultra-low interest rates. 
Accordingly, the old view that favoured fiscal policy restraint gave way to a new view, in 
which governments are temporarily expected to return to a more active role in 
macroeconomic management (Furman, 2016; Ubide, 2016). Still, there is also a question of 
time-consistency. After having helped the central bank to restore price stability, could 
governments be relied upon to comply again with their budget rules and debt ceilings? 
Politicians might instead prefer continued fiscal fine-tuning of the economy and/or force 
the central bank to give up its monetary policy independence, especially when the 
government faced a debt overhang and a return to higher real interest rates was unwelcome.  
The coordination between 19 national fiscal policies on the subject of low euro area 
average inflation could be especially complicated in the institutional set-up of EMU. 
Moreover, the alternative of a fiscal union is no panacea, as the political constellation may 
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still pose constraints on fiscal action to support monetary policy. Bernanke (2015, p. 491) 
writes in his memoir of the financial crisis that other Washington policymakers than the US 
Federal Reserve should have taken more responsibility for promoting economic growth 
after the Great Recession. “The reality was that the Fed was the only game in town. It was 
up to us to do what we could, imperfect as our tools might be.” Bernanke was an active 
promotor of the fiscal stimulus package that was put together to fight the US economic 
slowdown and recession of 2007-09. After February 2009, however, Congress shifted into 
austerity mode. Since further fiscal support after the Great Recession was lacking, the Fed 
responded to the fragile economic outlook in November 2010 with a second round of 
quantitative easing. The US Congress was also regularly in a standoff with the 
Administration over extending or raising the federal government’s debt ceiling3 and only 
gave in when spending cuts and tax increases were enacted. This fiscal headwind offset 
much of the effect of the monetary stimulus and was one reason for the Fed to postpone the 
tapering of its purchases of Treasury bonds until December 2013. Bernanke (2015, p.539) 
felt frustrated with the government’s dysfunction, stating that “fiscal policymakers, far 
from helping the economy, appeared to be actively working to hinder it”. Yet, “[m]onetary 
policy … cannot carry the entire burden”.   
Second, as commented by White (2016), the effectiveness of the unconventional monetary 
experiments is subject to decreasing returns to scale whereas the negative reform incentives 
become more prominent over time. As regards fiscal discipline, the credit and quantitative 
easing measures coupled with forward guidance to place downward pressure on long-term 
interest rates created considerable budgetary advantages for high-debt governments as they 
eased the intertemporal budget constraint. Politicians were in fact encouraged to postpone 
fiscal retrenchment as long as budget deficits could be financed at low cost.   
Orphanides (2016) raises the point that public trust in monetary policy might become more 
tentative when central banks wade far into fiscal and quasi-fiscal terrain seeking to steer 
both the price and allocation of credit. Since they directly affect the distribution of income 
and wealth well beyond the ordinary impact of conventional monetary policy or temporary 
interventions as lender of last resort, their prolonged large-scale balance sheet operations 
raise questions of democratic legitimacy and accountability. Moreover, in the particular 
                                                 
3  The federal debt ceiling authorises the US government to borrow funds to cover its existing legal obligations. Over the 
past decades, the US Congress has frequently acted to permanently raise, temporarily extend, or revise the definition 
of the statutory debt limit. Otherwise the US Treasury would have to defer payment obligations which have already 
been approved in the budget or default on its debt service obligations. 
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structure of EMU, quantitative easing also leads to a significant redistribution of resources 
between stronger and weaker member countries (Reis, 2017). Growing dissatisfaction with 
the greater reach of central banks and the larger distributional implications could undermine 
public support for their statutory independence (de Haan et al., 2017). These concerns make 
it necessary to clarify the borderline between monetary and fiscal policies, notably by 
assigning ultimate responsibility for the fiscal and quasi-fiscal implications of using 
unconventional monetary tools to the state (Buiter, 2014).  
A third and related fiscal issue arises from the risks that the central bank assumes on its 
much expanded balance sheet, on behalf of the taxpayer. Hall and Reis (2015) stress the 
implications of new-style central banking for the financial strength of central banks and, 
hence, their financial independence. The crisis-related practice of issuing large amounts of 
risk-free interest-paying monetary reserves against a wider range of eligible collateral or in 
order to purchase long-duration private and/or public sector assets exposes the central bank 
to exchange-rate, interest-rate and default risks. A large central bank balance sheet means 
that net monetary income could turn out to be negative more often than under old-style 
central banking, affecting the financial relationship with the government (Blinder et al., 
2017). The adverse consequences for the central bank’s profits and ultimately its financial 
reserves and its capital base raise the question whether the treasury will be willing to 
backstop major losses.  
Given the monopoly power to issue any amount of domestic currency legal tender and the 
willingness of private agents to hold this currency, the central bank of an advanced 
economy can in theory always redeem its obligations and is technically able to run its 
monetary policy operations even with negative equity (De Grauwe and Ji, 2013). A 
government commitment to recapitalise the central bank therefore appears superfluous. 
This assessment changes when the central bank engineers a large monetary expansion 
outside crisis conditions that poses a clear and present danger for price stability. This could 
lead money holders to question the continued stability of the currency and the value of the 
central bank’s monetary liabilities. When the central bank has engineered a large-for-longer 
balance sheet with risky assets it could run into financial difficulties and this situation 
might impair its credibility as a successful inflation fighter. The value of ex ante fiscal 
support is that it caters for such contingencies and permanently protects the financial 
soundness of the central bank (Del Negro and Sims, 2015). Appropriate institutional 
arrangements should ensure that the central bank is always able to recover its financial 
11 
 
strength over time and can continue to fund its monetary policy operations without political 
interference or having to ask prior approval from the treasury (see Amtenbrink, 2005). 
Only in a few countries the treasury in recent years explicitly promised to indemnify their 
central bank against potential capital losses on their growing portfolio of risk-prone 
securities. For example, the Bank of England received an indemnity from the UK 
government to cover any losses arising from the use of its Special Liquidity Scheme and 
Asset Purchase Facility for monetary policy purposes (Buiter, 2014). Elsewhere, central 
banks mainly tightened their risk management procedures and/or reduced their dividend 
payments to the state so as to build up extra financial buffers against the cost of higher 
future net interest payments, valuation changes and the risk of default on security holdings. 
Avoiding negative equity and an ex post recapitalisation was important for them to preserve 
their financial independence, operational autonomy and the public perception of a strong 
monetary capacity. Again, in the context of EMU, distributional aspects must also be 
considered. With a few exceptions, the profits and losses on monetary policy operations are 
generally shared within the Eurosystem. An automatic fiscal backup for the ECB or the 
euro area NCBs has never been formalised. 
3. How could euro area governments support the ECB? 
3.1 The specific economic and legal setting of the eurozone 
Historically, before the start of EMU, national sovereign bonds performed the role of safe 
benchmark instrument for their domestic economy. With the start of EMU, however, the 
position of euro area governments has changed fundamentally. Participating Member States 
relinquished their monetary sovereignty and were thus no longer able to issue bonds in a 
currency under their own monetary control. This restriction of their sovereign powers made 
their new position comparable to that of ‘subsidiary governments’ like the American States 
that can only issue semi-safe debt and depend on federal fiscal stabilisers to absorb large 
shocks – supranational elements which in the EMU context are missing (see van Riet, 
2017a). The semi-safe status of national government bonds makes euro area countries 
vulnerable to market upheavals and forces them to concentrate their fiscal policies on 
reducing sovereign credit risk and their structural policies on increasing the resilience of 
their economies. The Maastricht Treaty, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the 
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) in fact support the adoption of sound and 
sustainable national economic policies.   
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The specific economic and legal setting of EMU with its focus on national risk reduction 
relies on the single market, the single currency and the single monetary policy to function 
as supranational risk-sharing mechanisms (Schelkle 2017). This constellation makes the 
ECB by definition the ‘only game in town’ to counteract area-wide deflation in a 
widespread balance sheet recession (Praet, 2017). An important policy question is 
therefore: how can euro area governments nevertheless support the ECB in its task of 
maintaining price stability for the eurozone, especially in an environment of sustained low 
interest rates? The argument advanced below is that, in the absence of a fiscal union, they 
will need to act together as the ‘joint sovereign’ behind the euro (see Hoeksma and 
Schoenmaker, 2011; van Riet, 2016a) and establish complementary risk-sharing institutions 
in the field of economic and financial policies, while staying within the confines of the 
Maastricht Treaty. 
3.2 A more balanced euro area economic and monetary policy mix 
After the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis in early 2010, many euro area countries 
embarked on a path of fiscal consolidation in order to maintain or restore public debt 
sustainability and some also initiated structural reforms to revive economic dynamism. This 
policy response was vital for them to strengthen market confidence and preserve their status 
as a trustworthy debtor. The crisis-hit countries also had to comply with their EU/IMF 
adjustment programmes and the others needed to observe the EU economic governance 
rules. However, in the aggregate these national macroeconomic policies were pro-cyclical 
and contributed to the broad-based weakness of the euro area economy in a period when the 
private sector was also engaged in a protracted debt deleveraging (van Riet, 2018). 
As there is no euro area treasury with its own budget, the ECB missed a sovereign 
counterpart to assist with macroeconomic stabilisation at the EMU level, which could have 
facilitated monetary policy management, shortened the period of record-low interest rates 
and mitigated the unintended negative side-effects. The European Commission, the IMF 
and the OECD therefore all issued recommendations to the euro area governments to 
organise an aggregate fiscal expansion consistent with the orientation of the single 
monetary policy, so as to more effectively remove the persistent slack in the euro area 
economy. 
However, in the euro area context, only those countries that have achieved their medium-
term budgetary objective and face low risks to fiscal sustainability could in principle add a 
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discretionary fiscal impulse to the central bank’s monetary stimulus. These voluntary 
contributions should moreover not lead to a destabilisation of their own economies. By 
contrast, the euro area nations without such fiscal space should first reduce their structural 
budget deficits to restore sustainable public finances in line with SGP requirements. At 
most, they could enhance the role of automatic stabilisers in the budget. The organisation of 
an appropriate euro area fiscal stance is therefore handicapped by the need for member 
countries to find an appropriate balance between their budgetary contribution to union-wide 
macroeconomic stabilisation and domestic requirements for achieving and maintaining 
fiscal sustainability (see Bańkowski and Ferdinandusse, 2017).  
This constraint on coordinated fiscal action could be overcome with a central fiscal capacity 
that serves as a complementary source of national fiscal space subject to common decision-
making (van Riet, 2018). The European Commission (2017) has advanced three options 
that fiscal policymakers could further explore in order to enhance euro area macroeconomic 
stabilisation in a severe economic downturn: they could set up a European investment 
protection scheme that allows all member countries to proceed with public investment 
projects, provide for a European unemployment reinsurance scheme that reduces the impact 
on national budgets from rising unemployment rates, or build up a rainy day fund from 
national contributions which makes disbursements in case of a large adverse shock. A euro 
area budget for cyclical stabilisation purposes was regarded as a goal for the longer term.  
All member countries could on their own also implement unconventional fiscal policies, i.e. 
undertake a quasi-monetary easing through budget-neutral tax and subsidy measures that 
relaxed domestic financing conditions for households and corporations (Correia, 2016). 
Each country could furthermore improve the quality of public finances and undertake 
structural reforms with the aim to raise potential growth, focusing on productive public 
investments, lower marginal tax rates and labour and product market deregulation. In 
addition, they could speed up balance sheet repair in the private sector so that overcapacity 
in the banking sector is reduced, viable banks can expand access to their credit, firms use 
the opportunity of more attractive credit supply conditions to expand their production 
capacity and workers regain confidence to translate their higher disposable income into 
extra spending. An acceleration of productivity growth would moreover raise the 
equilibrium real interest rate over time, which in turn would increase the future scope for 
lowering the monetary policy rate before it reached the effective lower bound. 
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Altogether, appropriately targeted national contributions to the euro area economic policy 
mix facilitated by a central fiscal capacity could support the ECB in meeting its price 
stability objective and reduce the need for advancing non-standard monetary policy into 
unfamiliar territory. Although the architecture of EMU does not foresee explicit monetary-
fiscal-structural policy coordination, national governments have a shared responsibility to 
support the ECB’s fight against low inflation and mitigate any adverse side-effects of ultra-
low interest rates in the common interest of the euro area (van Riet, 2017c). 
3.3 A formal fiscal backup for the Eurosystem 
The specific EMU setting also has implications for the financial relationship between the 
Eurosystem and the 19 euro area governments. The net monetary income accruing to each 
of the euro area NCBs in the performance of the monetary policy function is in principle 
shared at the Eurosystem level before being allocated to them in proportion to their paid-up 
shares in the capital key of the ECB. They subsequently remit these profits to their own 
governments and any private shareholders in accordance with national arrangements. As 
shareholders, the euro area NCBs will also receive their share of the ECB’s profits after it 
has made the necessary risk provisions and replenished its financial buffers.  
Henning (2016) suggests that the principle of sharing the net financial results from the 
single monetary policy has made the ECB reluctant to act as a crisis fighter and to initiate 
quantitative easing operations in sovereign bond markets. The ECB feared that the 
attendant mutualisation of sovereign risk might fuel moral hazard and take individual 
governments ‘off the hook’ for fiscal and financial reforms. At the same time, so he argues, 
euro area countries attempted to exploit the crisis for extracting monetary accommodation 
from the ECB. This two-way strategic interaction prevented a quick resolution of the crisis 
and delayed forceful monetary policy interventions. Henning (2016) states that in principle 
the euro area governments could also have struck an ex ante bargain with the ECB to 
indemnify the Eurosystem against the potential losses on public sector bond purchases 
undertaken to stabilise EMU.  
Corsetti et al. (2016a) make a similar point, stressing the risk of large capital losses for the 
Eurosystem and the potential need for a recapitalisation by the euro area governments. 
They argue that the prevailing ex ante uncertainty about the availability of fiscal support to 
its balance sheet might make the Eurosystem overly cautious with regard to unconventional 
monetary policy measures, notably when it wishes to activate large-scale balance sheet 
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operations, commit to ‘last resort’ lending, and relax the collateral eligibility criteria. 
Corsetti et al. (2016a) fear that such a bias towards a too tight monetary policy, especially 
at the effective lower bound for short-term interest rates, would lead to an under-reaction to 
a financial crisis, more sluggish economic growth and too low inflation.  
For the Eurosystem, profit and loss considerations as such do not play a role in defining 
monetary policy measures. This is also facilitated by the financial independence of the ECB 
and the NCBs. However, as discussed below, the fiscal transfers implied by sharing both 
the monetary income and the sovereign risks related to public sector bond purchases must 
be strictly limited from the outset.4  
The sovereign debt crisis and the market access difficulties for affected countries caused a 
fragmentation of euro area financial markets along national lines, which seriously impaired 
an even monetary transmission. The ECB responded with the Securities Markets 
Programme (SMP) and purchased about EUR 220 bn. of long-term sovereign bonds from 
May 2010 to March 2012. These interventions managed to stabilise the markets somewhat 
during periods of severe tensions. Although the SMP was not subject to explicit 
conditionality, the ECB took note of the commitments taken by the countries concerned to 
accelerate fiscal consolidation and ensure the sustainability of their public finances. In 
addition, it was accompanied by direct communications between the ECB and the national 
authorities to contain the sovereign credit risk associated with the SMP. 
Following the ECB president’s pledge on 26 July 2012 to do “whatever it takes” to 
preserve the euro, within the limits of the ECB’s mandate, the SMP was replaced in 
September 2012 by a commitment to undertake unlimited Outright Monetary Transactions 
(OMTs) in disrupted national government bond markets if this was justified by monetary 
policy concerns. First, the purpose of the OMT as a ‘contingent balance sheet policy’ 
(ECB, 2015; Cour-Thimann and Winkler, 2016) is to counteract currency redenomination 
risk and safeguard the transmission of monetary policy. Since a monetary easing is not 
intended, the liquidity injected as a result of the OMT will be fully sterilised. Second, any 
activation of this monetary backstop is freely decided by the Governing Council of the ECB 
and is conditional on the affected country’s strict and effective compliance with a full 
adjustment programme associated with a loan from the EFSF/ESM or with the enhanced 
                                                 
4  Another exception is the acceptance of domestic credit claims owned by banks as eligible collateral. The NCBs carry 
themselves the risk of losses in this particular case, as they also do for emergency liquidity assistance given to 
troubled domestic credit institutions outside their monetary policy function. 
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policy conditions of a precautionary credit line from the EFSF/ESM. For the design and 
monitoring of the country-specific conditionality the involvement of the IMF will be 
sought. The national policy reforms to be undertaken in this context reduce the likelihood 
of a sovereign default. Moreover, the exclusive focus on eliminating tail risk in volatile 
government bond markets should leave ample room for market-based fiscal discipline. 
The ECB’s quantitative easing in terms of government bonds was designed with a view to 
both limiting credit risk exposure and reducing monetary financing concerns (see also 
Bletzinger and von Thadden, 2017). The public sector purchase programme (PSPP) that is 
being implemented since March 2015 covers marketable investment-grade debt instruments 
issued by euro area central, regional and local governments, recognised public sector 
agencies, and European supranational institutions located in the euro area.5 The allocation 
of the monthly purchases between euro area countries is guided by the ECB’s capital key 
(with some flexibility) and hence not by the proportion of their outstanding debt. Yields at 
the time of purchase had to stand above the ECB’s deposit facility rate against which the 
injected central bank reserves are remunerated. As from December 2016, if necessary, it 
was made possible to buy public sector bonds yielding below the deposit facility rate, 
which on net implies small costs. The total amount of public sector bond purchases is 
capped at 25% of a given issue (which was raised to 33% as from November 2015)6 and an 
aggregate holding limit of 33% per issuer.7 These ceilings serve to preserve market 
discipline and safeguard pari passu (i.e. equal) treatment with respect to private creditors.  
The PSPP is furthermore subject to a special regime for sharing (possible but unforeseen) 
losses (see Figure 4). Only 20% of any losses on the whole portfolio of public sector 
securities will be fully shared within the Eurosystem; any losses on the remaining 80% of 
the portfolio are for the sole account of the NCBs, relating specifically to their purchases of 
bonds issued by central, regional and local governments and public sector agencies of their 
own country. At the same time, the (negative) interest costs paid to the euro area banking 
sector on the corresponding central bank reserves are pooled.     
                                                 
5  Government bonds of euro area countries receiving EU/IMF financial assistance, which do not meet the minimum 
credit quality threshold, could benefit from a waiver, provided that their adjustment programme could be assessed as 
being on track. After mid-2015, the Eurosystem was thus able to add government bonds issued by Cyprus to the PSPP.     
6  The issue limit refers to the maximum share of a single PSPP-eligible security that the Eurosystem is prepared to hold 
so as to avoid having a blocking minority in case collective action clauses in a government bond contract would be 
activated in an orderly debt restructuring. 
7  The issuer limit refers to the maximum share of a single issuer’s outstanding securities that the Eurosystem is prepared 
to hold so as to safeguard market functioning and price formation as well as to mitigate the risk of the Eurosystem 
becoming a dominant creditor of euro area governments. 
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Figure 4 – Loss-sharing regime applied to the Public Sector Purchase Programme  
 
Source: ECB. 
This specific loss-sharing regime was felt to be appropriate for two reasons (Praet, 2015). 
The first objective is to preserve monetary dominance vis-à-vis the 19 euro area 
governments. Given the Maastricht Treaty provisions, the single monetary policy needed to 
remain separated from the national fiscal policies. The Eurosystem balance sheet should not 
serve as the vehicle for monetising the inherent credit and liquidity risks of euro area 
sovereigns. To prevent that the ECB could ever be forced to deviate from its monetary 
policy course if the national sovereign risks associated with the PSPP materialised, it was 
decided that the NCBs would carry most of the direct financial consequences, for better and 
for worse.  
A second motivation for this specific loss-sharing regime is to counteract moral hazard. At 
the start of the PSPP, the government debt-to-GDP ratios were still (very) high. With full 
risk sharing, countries would be able to impose a substantial part of the costs of a potential 
debt restructuring on all euro area taxpayers rather than their own. The ECB had to avoid 
introducing a large-scale mutualisation of national sovereign risks and the emergence of a 
fiscal transfer union by the back door of a risk-sharing arrangement. Full risk sharing could 
only be considered when all member countries had sustainable public finances and were 
expected to maintain their fiscal soundness over time.   
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As regards their financial strength, a harmonised Eurosystem accounting framework 
ensures that the ECB and each NCB apply prudent principles for the recognition of income. 
Moreover, all euro-denominated securities acquired for monetary policy purposes are 
valued at amortised cost subject to impairment. This common accounting rule avoids 
valuation losses on the monetary policy portfolio due to rising future interest rates as long 
as these securities are held and no adverse scenario materialises.  
The rules for retaining earnings and distributing profits follow ECB and national 
conventions, respectively (Bunea et al., 2016). Some NCBs are obliged to distribute a high 
share of their profits as dividend. Several other NCBs are using the interest receipts on their 
portfolio of national public sector bonds and other sources of income to build extra 
financial buffers and, hence, limit the remittances to their government in the short run. This 
provisioning might be motivated by the political complications of having to ask the treasury 
ex post for a recapitalisation. As an exception, the Nederlandsche Bank received an ex ante 
guarantee from the Dutch government in 2012 to cover the crisis-related risk exposures 
until these had returned to normal. This insurance could be activated in the years 2013-17 
up to a maximum of EUR 5.7 bn. and avoided having to create special risk provisions that 
would have reduced its dividend payments. 
An NCB that faces major credit impairments, for example related to a potential own 
sovereign default, may carry the losses forward for the part that cannot be covered by its 
risk provisions and capital base. This could temporarily lead to a situation in which the 
NCB records a very low or even negative equity position,8 until retained future profits 
enable it to restore the original level of statutory capital. This accounting solution has major 
political advantages (see also Durré, 2016). The country concerned may face serious 
funding constraints in replenishing the capital base quickly in a situation of fiscal stress. 
The possibility to carry the losses forward avoids that it has to make a politically 
contentious transfer of scarce financial resources to the NCB, or even has to draw on 
conditional EU/IMF support facilities for a recapitalisation.  
As stated by the ECB (2016b, p.25), “financial independence … implies that an NCB 
should always be sufficiently capitalised”. A long-lasting situation of net equity being less 
than an NCB’s statutory capital or even negative, including cases where losses beyond the 
                                                 
8  No negative equity would have to be reported when the loss is recorded as a claim against the national government, 
but this could be perceived as a form of monetary financing.  
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level of capital and reserves are carried over into the future, could be perceived as having a 
negative impact on the NCB’s ability to perform both its ESCB/Eurosystem and national 
tasks. The respective Member State ought in that case to recapitalise its NCB within a 
reasonable period of time.9     
The ECB on its part is independent in the management of its finances and has considerable 
financial buffers in place. Even during the euro area crisis years, the ECB always reported 
an annual profit (see ECB, 2016a). The Governing Council decided to increase the ECB’s 
subscribed capital from EUR 5.7 bn. to EUR 10.7 bn. in 2010, a possibility that the EU 
Council had approved already in the year 2000 following an ECB recommendation.10 The 
euro area NCBs paid their additional capital contributions in three instalments between 
2010 and 2012. A further recapitalisation of the ECB by the euro area NCBs, if ever 
necessary, is complicated to agree ex post in a setting whereby the EU Council must consult 
with the European Parliament and the European Commission and 19 euro area governments 
all have to give their blessing. Should its financial buffers ever be exhausted, it might ask 
the NCBs to cover a remaining loss with a contribution from their net monetary income in 
proportion to their paid-up shares in the ECB’s capital key. Otherwise, the ECB could 
record the negative difference on its balance sheet and rebuild its financial buffers with the 
seigniorage revenues and other income that it accrues over time before resuming dividend 
payments (Bunea et al., 2016). Still, a prolonged financial constraint that is not covered by 
euro area governments could undermine the credibility of the single monetary policy. 
Moreover, it could raise political and communication concerns.11  
Confidence in the Eurosystem could therefore benefit from an unconditional political 
commitment from all participating countries to respect not only the monetary authority's 
statutory independence but also to maintain its financial strength for the credible pursuit of 
its monetary policy mandate. The related EMU-specific coordination challenge can in 
principle be overcome with democratically legitimised national fiscal guarantees against 
large losses that respect national budget rights (Illing and König, 2014). The 19 member 
                                                 
9  Note that the NCBs of Slovakia and the Czech Republic have been able to perform their tasks even though they both 
have recorded negative equity for quite a long time.  
10  Article 28(1) of the ESCB/ECB Statute provides that the ECB’s capital may be increased by such amounts as may be 
decided by the Governing Council of the ECB, within the limits and under the conditions set by the EU Council. 
11  The US Federal Reserve has to possibility to record a negative liability in a deferred account and then balance it using 
retained earnings accruing in the future. Yet, the Fed would face “a political and public relations problem” if it had to 
suspend dividend payments to the US Treasury while it continued making interest payment to banks – many of them 
foreign-owned – for their reserve account holdings (Bernanke, 2015, p.542).  
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countries could each provide an explicit fiscal protection, committing when necessary to 
recapitalise their own NCB as well as (indirectly) the ECB. These ex ante fiscal guarantees 
would demonstrate that euro area governments carry ultimate responsibility for the balance 
sheet risks that the Eurosystem assumes on behalf of the taxpayers of all member countries.  
Since their purpose is to underpin public trust in the single monetary policy and its capacity 
to preserve price stability for the euro area as a whole, the fiscal guarantees should ideally 
be joint and several commitments whereby each country, if necessary, also covers for the 
others. However, the potential fiscal transfers would go against the Maastricht Treaty 
provisions. Moreover, some countries are still in a precarious fiscal position which reduces 
the value of their guarantee, and the other members with sound public finances may for that 
reason refuse to pledge such a guarantee (Buiter, 2014).  
This dilemma can only be solved once all member countries have achieved sustainable 
public finances, making risk sharing acceptable, or when a fiscal union has been 
established, since the fiscal guarantee could then be provided by the euro area treasury. In 
the absence of a joint and several fiscal backup, it could be expected that the ECB will 
allocate most of its exceptional balance sheet risks to the NCBs (notably those related to 
public sector bond purchases) rather than sharing them evenly as is the case for 
conventional monetary policy.        
3.4 A safe sovereign asset for the eurozone 
Even in the absence of further fiscal integration, one of the building blocks still necessary 
to strengthen the architecture of EMU is a single safe sovereign asset that functions as the 
cornerstone of a stable and truly single euro area financial system (for a discussion see van 
Riet, 2017a). The availability of a euro area sovereign bond would enhance financial 
stability in the euro area as a whole, because it would meet the financial sector’s rising 
demand for high-quality and liquid assets needed to comply with the EU’s prudential 
capital and liquidity requirements and it mitigates the risk of destabilising intra-area capital 
flows in and out of the debt instruments of member countries perceived as ‘safe’ or ‘risky’. 
In addition, it is an effective tool to break the negative feedback loop between national 
governments being exposed to systemic banks in their jurisdiction and weak banks in turn 
being dependent on rescues by their own sovereign. As it promotes asset diversification and 
enhances financial integration it would also support an even transmission of the single 
monetary policy across the eurozone. A euro area sovereign instrument would furthermore 
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be an attractive form of collateral for secured interbank lending; and if it was also accepted 
as eligible collateral by the ECB, it could be pledged by banks drawing on the ECB’s credit 
facilities. The ECB could also decide to use it for large-scale public sector bond purchases, 
when needed for monetary policy purposes.  
European leaders have a shared responsibility for safeguarding the stability of EMU. 
Without moving to a fiscal union, they are well-advised to implement a politically 
acceptable alternative for the issuance of eurobonds that does not require common liability. 
One potential solution among others is to allow for the introduction of a new eurozone 
security that is backed by a weighted portfolio of sovereign bonds of all euro area countries 
and issued in the form of a senior and a junior tranche. The eurozone security should be 
structured such that the senior tranche has a very low probability of default and the junior 
tranche carries the credit risks on the underlying portfolio of national sovereign bonds. The 
Eurogroup could charge, for example, the ESM with this task, or else enable the private 
sector to take this initiative (see Brunnermeier et al., 2017; Corsetti et al., 2016b).  
Depending on its ultimate market size, the eurozone security would have the potential to 
internalise a significant part of destabilising debt-based intra-area capital flows and 
generate a safer EMU financial system, especially when the banking industry would invest 
above all in the senior tranches that carry a safety premium. The systemic risk reduction 
would benefit, in particular, the more vulnerable countries and their financial sector, which 
in turn reduces the likelihood of the ESM having to serve as a fiscal backstop for distressed 
euro area countries and/or their banks. A safer banking sector could also make it acceptable 
to complete the European Banking Union with a temporary common fiscal backstop for the 
Single Resolution Fund and the proposed European Deposit Insurance Scheme.   
Subject to evaluation and decision by the Governing Council of the ECB, the senior tranche 
could also serve as a suitable financial instrument for providing monetary accommodation 
through public sector bond purchases along the term structure, if it was available in various 
maturities. The by construction very low default risk on the senior tranche could in that 
case be shared evenly between NCBs according to the ECB’s capital key, as is the case 
already under the PSPP for the bonds issued by European supranational institutions (see 
Figure 4). The enhanced stability of national sovereign bond markets would, on the margin, 
also ease the trade-off between fiscal space and fiscal sustainability and increase the ability 
for (several) euro area governments to support the ECB’s monetary policy at the effective 
lower bound. Since the risk of a renewed financial fragmentation along national lines is 
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more contained, there would also be less need for any exceptional ECB interventions to 
stabilise disrupted government bond markets for monetary policy purposes. The consequent 
overall risk reduction could in turn make it acceptable to euro area governments to provide 
an ex ante fiscal guarantee to the Eurosystem. 
A number of thorny questions will need to be answered in case it was decided to introduce 
a structured eurozone security.12 For example, what arrangements are needed to ensure that 
the senior tranche receives a triple-A credit rating, the subordinated junior tranche enjoys 
sufficient investor demand, the proper functioning of national sovereign bond markets is 
preserved, and that any mutualisation of losses on the underlying bond portfolio is 
prevented? Furthermore, the need to build up and maintain a diversified portfolio should be 
expected to ease capital market access for the participating countries. To contain moral 
hazard, these purchases could in principle be made conditional on their compliance with the 
EU rules for fiscal and structural policies (while excluding EU/IMF programme countries) 
(cf. de Haan et al., 2016). Yet, the main purpose of the eurozone security is to foster and 
safeguard the common public good of EMU-wide stability.  
Alternatively, the preferential treatment of government bonds in EU prudential legislation 
as zero-risk assets without exposure limit (see van Riet, 2016b) could be gradually reduced 
and carefully phased out for the euro area countries. After all, the senior and junior 
component of the eurozone security would in part take their place on bank and non-bank 
balance sheets. Another matter is whether such a regulatory privilege should be assigned to 
the senior tranche of the eurozone security in order to maintain a level playing field in 
international capital markets, where the issuing body would compete for funds with non-
euro area governments (US, UK, etc.). Maintaining this preferential regulatory treatment 
for the senior tranche would recognise its characteristic as a low-risk asset that unifies and 
stabilises the euro area financial system.  
Finally, to make it interesting for investors to include these eurozone instruments in their 
portfolios, the EU regulatory provision that demands extra capital charges for structured 
products would have to be amended so as to recognise that their claim on the underlying 
portfolio derives from semi-safe governments instead of risky private sector entities.   
                                                 
12  The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) is currently studying the feasibility of creating sovereign bond-backed 
securities consisting of senior, mezzanine and junior claims on a diversified portfolio of central government bonds 
without mutualisation of sovereign risk. The ECB has taken note of this work and does not yet have an established 
position on the outcome. 
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6. Concluding remarks 
At the effective lower bound for short-term interest rates, monetary policy in the advanced 
economies appeared to be stretched to the limit in addressing a secular stagnation marked 
by a very low equilibrium real interest rate. Considering the obstacles to a negative interest 
rate policy, central banks deployed unconventional instruments and forward guidance to 
provide the necessary further monetary accommodation. Although effective in easing credit 
conditions and reviving the economy, the unorthodox measures raised questions about the 
central bank being the only public institution responsible for restoring macroeconomic 
equilibrium in a prolonged slump. Concerns were also raised about the fiscal and quasi-
fiscal nature of the allocation and distribution effects, the risk of undermining market 
functioning and fiscal discipline, the distortion of private incentives for risk-taking, and 
other unintended adverse side-effects of ultra-low interest rates. Moreover, central banks 
assumed ever-larger risks on their balance sheets on behalf of taxpayers. Hence, new-style 
central banking put the relationship with fiscal policy to the test.  
Given the incomplete architecture of EMU, the ECB faced even more complex challenges 
in a set-up without a euro area fiscal counterpart and a legal setting that clearly separated 
the single monetary policy domain from that of the 19 national fiscal policies. While the 
strict separation between euro area governments and the ECB was appropriate when there 
were upside inflation risks, at the effective lower bound for interest rates it appeared to 
unduly constrain the central bank in applying non-standard monetary easing measures and 
in using its balance sheet as an operational tool. Acting as the ‘joint sovereign’ behind the 
euro, euro area governments could support the ECB in three ways to overcome these 
limitations, while staying within the boundaries of the Maastricht Treaty.  
First, euro area governments could do more to align their national fiscal and structural 
policies in the Eurogroup and build a central fiscal capacity subject to common decision-
making to play a more active role in counteracting a protracted EMU-wide economic 
stagnation. A growth-friendly euro area economic policy mix complementary to sound 
national policies would limit the need for the single monetary policy to arrange for an 
extended period of very low interest rates. Targeting a higher potential growth path could in 
this context help to raise the equilibrium real interest rate and create more room for 
standard interest rate manoeuvre before the ECB would hit the effective lower bound.   
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Second, the monetary policy task of the Eurosystem could be facilitated by the availability 
of a safe sovereign asset for the eurozone, as indispensable cornerstone of an integrated 
euro area financial system that makes EMU less prone to the risk of destabilising capital 
flows. The national authorities could provide the framework conditions for introducing a 
new eurozone security that is structured in a senior and junior component without 
introducing common liability. As a low-risk instrument, the senior tranche could enhance 
financial integration, increase financial stability, support an even monetary transmission 
and – if so decided by the ECB – play an important role in monetary policy operations.  
Third, confidence in the Eurosystem could benefit from euro area governments explicitly 
taking collective responsibility for the financial risks that it assumes on its balance sheet, in 
particular when undertaking non-standard monetary policy interventions. National fiscal 
guarantees against potential central bank losses, democratically legitimated, could clarify 
that these financial risks are ultimately a fiscal responsibility. On the one hand, the specific 
EMU architecture poses limitations to the extent of risk sharing at the Eurosystem level, 
especially for purchases of semi-safe public sector bonds. On the other hand, a consistent 
euro area policy mix and a safe sovereign asset for the eurozone while preserving sound 
national policies lower the burden placed on the Eurosystem’s monetary policy and reduce 
its exposure to sovereign risk. This overall risk reduction could clear the way for national 
governments to make an unconditional commitment to recapitalise their own NCB as well 
as (indirectly) the ECB if ever needed.        
Each of these three fiscal support options has so far been relegated to the future, awaiting 
further fiscal integration. The consequence of this ‘political paralysis’ to relieve the burden 
on ECB monetary policy was a long-lasting period of record-low interest rates that was 
perceived as financial repression of savers and a transfer of resources in favour of 
borrowers, including sovereigns. These significant distributional implications may 
undermine public support for unconventional monetary policy measures and could 
ultimately lead politicians to amend the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty that so far have 
protected the statutory independence of the Eurosystem. The fundamental solution lies in 
making fiscal positions sound and sustainable in all member countries and advancing with 
political integration to establish a euro area fiscal counterpart to the Eurosystem that would 
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